1	THE COURT: Good morning. You may be seated.
2	Mr. Aldawsari, you have received a copy of the
3	presentence report, I believe?
4	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
5	THE COURT: And you have reviewed it with your
6	counsel?
7	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
8	THE COURT: And I have noted the objections that
9	have been filedthe first one on the obstruction of justice,
10	and the rest on the question of following the Guidelines or
11	not. Is that right, Mr. Cogdell?
12	MR. COGDELL: That is right, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Aldawsari?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
15	THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.
16	Mr. Haag, I have read your report and sentencing
17	memorandum, as I have read Mr. Cogdell's. Is there anything
18	else you want to say to me?
19	MR. HAAG: Yes, Your Honor. We do have one witness,
20	and we do have brief argument.
21	THE COURT: Put on your witness.
22	MR. HAAG: Yes, Your Honor.
23	MR. DOYLE: Judge, if I could, this witness is the
24	bomb expert, and I believe what he is going to try and
25	introduce is that video that you have already excluded at

1 trial, and I would object to the video --2 THE COURT: Is that right? 3 MR. HAAG: Your Honor, yes, we intend to play --THE COURT: I am fairly aware of what roughly 15 4 pounds of plastique can do. Do you really want to do that? 5 6 MR. HAAG: Your Honor, we do believe it will give the Court a full picture of the object of Mr. Aldawsari's 7 crime. 8 9 THE COURT: As I say, 12, 15 pounds, isn't that what 10 your expert said was recoverable at a minimum? MR. HAAG: Seven pounds and fifteen pounds; yes, 11 12 Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. I think not. I don't think it 14 will add anything. 15 Anything else you want to say? 16 MR. HAAG: Just brief argument and response, Your 17 Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, have a seat. 18 MR. HAAG: Your Honor, if I could, like to put the 19 20 two videos into evidence, even though we don't play them, just 21 for appeal purposes. 22 THE COURT: Sure. 23 MR. HAAG: Those would be Government's Exhibit 24 No. 387 and 395. 25 THE COURT: All right. They are received.

All right. Mr. Cogdell, who wants to talk to me first?

MR. COGDELL: Sure, Your Honor. Good morning, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, sir.

MR. COGDELL: Judge, as you know, we filed a rather extensive sentencing memorandum last week. I apologize to some extent for the timing of it. I know it was filed somewhat late, but it was filed in response to the Government's. I had surgery last week, and on a more helpful and positive note, Mr. Hester, who did the lion's share of the work, he was otherwise occupied, so for the timing of it I apologize.

THE COURT: Not to worry.

MR. COGDELL: I am going to be brief, Judge. In the landscape of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, there are really three sources of categories, as the memorandum points out.

The first are the types of cases where a life sentence is generally warranted, and those types of cases is where the Defendant attempts to use or does use a fully constructed weapon of mass destruction. As the memo points out, the Reid case which is the Shoe Bomber case, the Shahzad case which is the Times Square bombing, and I am not going to pronounce the name, I won't do it justice, the Abdulmattab case was the Christmas Day Bomber, in each of those cases where a life

sentence was warranted there was an actual weapon of mass destruction, there was no question an attempted detonation of that weapon of mass destruction, and there were generally aggravating factors beyond that.

THE COURT: Mr. Cogdell, in many ways that is what happened here. The cases that you cited, and in particular I see you cited one I just read about in the <u>New York Times</u> that took place in Boston, there were whiffs of entrapment, and they never were going to set off -- They were going to be stopped from setting it off.

MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: But for the grace of God, luck, fate, whatever you want to call it, that is what would have happened here.

MR. COGDELL: Well, two responses. The first is, in the life cases there were -- There are really three categories--the life cases, the sort of 20- to 30-year cases, and then the cases below 20 years. In the 20- to 30-year cases, which I believe the Court is noting, those cases dealt with where an inert bomb or inert weapon of mass destruction was delivered to the defendant, the defendant believed that --

THE COURT: Pushed the button.

MR. COGDELL: He was going to activate it. There was the one in Dallas where he drove a van parked it -- or SUV, parked it beneath --

THE COURT: Went around the block.

MR. COGDELL: Went around the block and went for a safe distance. The other was where an individual was going to fly a remote controlled airplane into the Pentagon.

THE COURT: That is the Boston case.

MR. COGDELL: -- and the state capitol. They drove from Boston, he did surveillance, he actually believed and pushed the button --

THE COURT: In this case, oddly enough--I am going to ask the Government about this--they recommended 17 years.

MR. COGDELL: They did. They did. And I don't want to run afoul of any rulings. I think 17 years is an appropriate resolution in this case. Had we been offered something in that zip code, we wouldn't have been here for a week. But be that as it may, it is self-evidence that the Government didn't recommend that in this case.

But in those cases -- And we are not claiming entrapment, and we are not disavowing our responsibility here or the finding of the jury, but in those 20- to 30-year cases, it is unquestionable that there was an attempted or belief on the part of the defendant, unlike here, that a bomb would be detonated. And unlike here, in those 20- to 30-year cases, there was a specified target. And unlike here in those 20- to 30-year cases, there was every reason on the part of the defendant in those cases to believe that when he was pushing

the button it would actually detonate.

I understand the Court's "but for the grace of God, go we all," and this type of analysis, but I still think it is paramount and critical that we distinguish between the mens rea and the actus rea--that is, the evil intent and the actuality of it. I am not condoning for a second what Mr. Aldawsari was convicted of doing, but when you look at the cases similar to and parallel to his conduct -- And again, Judge, we pointed out in the brief, but I believe that the best example is the Polk case where, in fact, I think the facts are more egregious in the Polk case, because there was a specified target, that being the IRS building in Austin, and that case, like this case, there was not a completed bomb, he didn't possess an actual weapon of mass destruction, although he had many of the precursor --

THE COURT: Mr. Cogdell, not to cut you off, I read those, but what has troubled me most in this case is 20-year-olds don't have a great deal of sense. That is a proven fact.

MR. COGDELL: I have a 20-year-old. I agree.

THE COURT: He was 20 years old. He apparently behaved well for a year in Vanderbilt where, according to the pictures that you sent me, he had friends, and things seemed to be going along just fine. And then he seems to have come to Texas Tech, gotten into a quarrel with at least one of his

friends, and, for whatever reason, he appears to have divorced himself from society, busted out of Texas Tech, came over to school—I have forgotten the name of the school right now—and apparently spent most of his time watching television programs designed to carry on attacks against the United States. He continued to watch them.

MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: He then planned to make plastique, and he had plans, for once it was made, places to use it.

MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What is giving me the trouble is his history until he started watching all that stuff. Tell me what happened. I am going ask him what happened. I don't know whether he is going to answer me or not.

MR. COGDELL: I think what happened, Judge, is fairly well detailed in Doctor Atiq's reports and Doctor Brown's findings. I think he assimilated himself well at Vanderbilt, he was surrounded by a social network that gave him some support and gave him a reason to believe that he could succeed. When he transferred or was transferred to Texas Tech, for whatever reason, that community and he was a literal disconnect.

THE COURT: I don't like that argument at all that the fundamentalist Texas Tech helped convert him.

MR. COGDELL: I am not disparaging either Lubbock or

Texas Tech. It wasn't a fit. I think, for whatever reason,
Judge, and I am not disparaging the folks in Lubbock or the
people at Texas Tech, or any group of people, I am saying the
fit--psychologically, academically, socially, whatever--at
Vanderbilt was a far better fit than the one that he
experienced in Lubbock and, as a result of that disconnect, I
believe it is pretty well documented that he slipped into a
major depressive episode that caused him literally a
psychological break with reality. And watching the jihadist
films and watching -- getting on the internet was -- an escape
is too mildly put, but I think it gave him a very misguided
path and a very misguided focus.

I can't explain it any better than Doctor Brown or Doctor Atiq did, but I believe that both of those psychiatrists tell us that with the proper medication and psychological intervention, that his risk of threat ultimately is far, far lower than the Government believes it to be.

So from a 3553 factor, I do believe that the Court should take into consideration that disconnect he experienced there, and I do believe that the 20 or year less cases are a better fit and a more apropos sentence in this case than the life cases—for the psychological effects, for the assimilation effects, and for again, Judge, the difference between the mens rea and the actus rea—the difference between what he thought about doing and then what was ultimately done. I don't think

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     we can divorce those factors at all. I think the
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     individuals that --
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               THE COURT: Aren't there -- Don't you suspect that
     there are a few Aldawsaris out there?
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               MR. COGDELL: I have no doubt that there are a few
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     Aldawsaris out there, but they are not before this --
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               THE COURT: That is true. But one of the things I
     have to consider is the deterrent effect.
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               MR. COGDELL: Fair and agreed. But two responses,
     Judge. One, I have never -- And I have never worn the black
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     robes and sentenced people, so it is easier for me to say this
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     than perhaps --
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               THE COURT: When I was a prosecutor it was real
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     easy.
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               MR. COGDELL: It is perhaps easier for the Court
     and/or prosecutor to do it. But I have never believed in sort
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     of the general deterrent if we sentence this Aldawsari, if you
     will, to a 30 or above sentence, it is going to deter the next
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     Aldawsari from similar conduct. I don't think that when they
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     are engaged in that conduct either, A, if they are truly
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     jihadist and they truly believe that there is an afterlife
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     that will benefit them, I don't think a sentence -- an earthly
23
     sentence, if you will, is going to deter it.
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believe that they are going to get caught or that the same

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The other part of that is that I do not believe that they

thing will happen to them.

So I understand the need for general deterrence. I also understand the need for specific deterrence. But most of all, I believe that he should be punished for what he did and not for what somebody else might do in the future, and for what he did being different than people who the Government wishes him to be similarly situated against or sentenced against whose conduct was far more egregious than that of Mr. Aldawsari.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.

And in closing, I know, Judge, how difficult a sentencing situation this is. I think everyone of us in this room gets that. I appreciate more than you know the trial without -- And we will not be representing Mr. Aldawsari on appeal, I don't believe, but without eroding the appellate issues that might present themselves on appeal, I appreciate more than you know this Court's conduct during the trial of Mr. Aldawsari. He does, too. Mr. Hester does too. Mr. Doyle does, too. Thank you.

But most of all, Judge, I ask you for a sentence that is reasonable and that fits this conduct, this individual, and this case.

But thank you again. And it is always a pleasure to appear in front of you, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Haag, I cannot remember a case in 27 years that has given me the difficulty that this case is giving me. Anybody can believe it or not. I at this moment do not know what I am going to do. I know what the parameters are.

On the side -- Well, let me ask you about -- what about the 17-year sentence recommended by the Government up in Massachusetts? When I saw that in the paper, I immediately called the judge and said, "What the hell is going on?" What makes this case so different?

MR. HAAG: Your Honor, I can't speak to the rationale behind the 17-year recommendation. My guess would be that because that was a plea agreement situation, there must have been some sort of mitigating factors in terms of entrapment, the Defendant's mental condition, something that gave the Government in that case pause to believe that at a jury trial situation they might not receive a favorable verdict, or that the Defendant's conduct warranted that sentence. I don't think any of the factors that were at play in this case are at play in this case.

THE COURT: He was ready to fly his plane into the capitol.

MR. HAAG: He was, Your Honor, but in that case the Government had control of the situation the entire time.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HAAG: In this case, as the Court pointed out,

1 but for the grace of God this would have ended up with a 2 completed explosion, deaths, casualties. The only thing that 3 prevented this from occurring was a report from private citizens and the action of law enforcement, and that is it. 4 5 There was nothing on Mr. Aldawsari's part that shows this Court that he had any intention at all of turning back from 6 the course that he set for himself in his journals. 7 THE COURT: The two bookends are he was 20 years old 8 and he slipped away from everything that he had been, although 9 10 he was highly educated, into this obsession. He was 20 years old. No trouble before. Family letters from them. 11 12 On the other end of the bookend is he would have done it. 13 I listened to the evidence. Without a doubt in my mind, had 14 he gotten the phenol there would be dead people as a result. 15 Is there a middle ground? MR. HAAG: Your Honor, I think in a situation such 16

MR. HAAG: Your Honor, I think in a situation such as this, there is not. And I think that is what the Guidelines -- I think that is what the Guidelines understand is the special problems that terrorists pose in terms of rehabilitation, recidivism. When you have --

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THE COURT: But in let me ask you this. In any event, whether he gets 10 years or he gets life imprisonment, at some time he is going back to Saudi Arabia under the treaty. Right?

MR. HAAG: Your Honor, in this case if he received a

life sentence, I would hope the United States would fight to keep him in jail for his entire life. And as we have pointed out, our position is that he poses a threat to American citizens not only here but especially to American citizens who are stationed abroad.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MR. HAAG: I would just like to comment just briefly on the Defense's argument about the *Polk* case and talk a little bit about how that is readily distinguishable from what we have here.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. HAAG: In the Polk case, the Guideline range in that case was 168 to 210 months, and the Court in that case imposed a sentence of 189 months.

If this Court were to look at the Guidelines, then, in order to get that Sentencing Guideline range, the district court in that case, for whatever reason, must have determined that the terrorism enhancement in Section 3A1.4 did not apply.

So we have two distinguishing factors. Number one, the terrorism enhancement in that case was deemed not to apply where here it clearly does. And the second is the Sentencing Guideline range in that case is much, much lower. And the court sentenced within the Guidelines in that case. Here the Guideline range is life imprisonment, and that is what we believe distinguishes the *Polk* case.

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I have a couple of more points, Your Honor.
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     frankly, do reiterate the Sentencing Guidelines memorandum, so
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     if --
               THE COURT: I have read it twice.
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               MR. HAAG: But we believe that based upon the nature
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     and circumstances of the offense, the deterrent effect, and,
 7
     most importantly, to prevent Mr. Aldawsari from committing
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     future crimes, that a life sentence is mandated in this case.
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          Thank you.
               THE COURT: Mr. Aldawsari, do you want to come up
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     with your counsel?
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          What do you have to say to me, sir?
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Shortly, I really would like to
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     apologize for what has happened. Hopefully no harm or injury
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     was caused to the United States. I believe that, like -- I do
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     not have any criminal history in the United States or
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     elsewhere.
          I think in this time I am only thinking about my family
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     only, especially that I was separated from my family since I
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     was arrested February 23, 2011.
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          I am sorry again, and I am sorry for the conduct and
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     everything that happened. I apologize. I thank you.
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               THE COURT: What happened, Mr. Aldawsari? What
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     happened between Vanderbilt and Texas Tech?
                               Well, I cannot recall the events
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               THE DEFENDANT:
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that took place at that time. I think I was very happy at that time at Vanderbilt in Nashville, Tennessee. I was social and I didn't have that much of social issues. I missed that good life that I had in Nashville, Tennessee.

When I was transferred to Texas Tech, my life had changed. I went under 80 percent, 180 degrees. Everything was changed. I didn't have the same chances and the same good life that I used to have. It was something very different for me to experience.

At the end, I think maybe there was something wrong that just did happen when I was in Texas Tech in Lubbock, and that did not appear before that time. Maybe all that time period I missed my family, I missed my relatives, and my friends.

The only thing I can say is that I apologize. I am sorry. I am happy that I did not commit the crime that could cause harm or injury to anyone. I am sorry.

Actually what happened at Texas Tech was exactly that there were only some bad writings. These bad writings did happen and took place at Texas Tech only in 2010.

The only thing that I can say, I did not have the weapon of mass destruction that can cause the harm or injury to the United States. In West Texas I couldn't practice my faith, I didn't have that much of friends, I was alone, I was isolated for a long time. Then some bad writings started to appear because of watching TV programs all that time.

I know maybe some of these bad writings translate to some actions. I am sorry for these bad actions, but at the end none of these bad actions did cause harm or injury to the United States.

THE COURT: Mr. Aldawsari, I still remember your phone calls, how angry you were that they had messed up on the phenol order.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I did cancel the phenol order

I think sometime in February 20th or the 21st.

The thing is I think I have struggled with myself maybe because I had some mental issues at that time. I did seek some mental help. I tried to communicate with psychologists before February 23. The thing is I think I was a bit depressed at that time, and because of my depression and social issues I couldn't make good decisions. And I am sorry again.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

I am going to adopt the factual findings of the Probation Office as set out in the presentence report.

I have considered all the factors of 3553. I have considered your youth at the time. I have considered the self-induced attitude, for want of a better word, that you got there, and I can even kind of understand the progression. I think -- I think you were self-willed into the attitude that you took, but I think you believed it.

All those factors would indicate that there is some reason to depart downward, but the bottom line is but by the grace of God there would be dead Americans everywhere, you would have done it, and you were doing it all by yourself. No one was encouraging you. Every step of the way it was you and you alone.

Accordingly, it is the judgment of the Court that you be sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for the rest of your life.

The usual conditions of supervised release, which will be a term of five-years, will apply, including mental health treatment as necessary.

\$100 assessment of the crime victim fund is required.

There will be no fine. None will be paid.

You have the right to appeal, and should you appeal the Clerk will send the presentence report and presentence memorandums to the Court of Appeals under seal.

Thank you very much. Thank you.

MR. COGDELL: In terms of recommendation, it is my recollection, and I could be wrong, but I do not believe that the Government objected to our request or will not object to our request of Springfield because it provides for psychological care and treatment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I will certainly recommend that. The Bureau of Prisons is the Executive Branch, but they have been

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     very good about following my recommendations.
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               MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.
               THE COURT: Gentlemen, you all did a very good job
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     of representing your client. I appreciate it, and I enjoyed
 5
     it.
          All right. Anything else before I --
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               MR. COGDELL: For the record, Your Honor, and I
     think -- And I am not sure how it played in the Northern
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     District, but we will be filing a motion to withdraw. It is
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     my belief that Patton Boggs is a firm that will file a notice
     of appearance and assist Mr. Aldawsari from henceforth.
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               THE COURT: If you will send me a courtesy copy, I
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     will sign it and email it.
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               MR. COGDELL: Yes, sir.
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               THE COURT:
                            Thank you.
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                            (End of hearing.)
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